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We investigate the long-run behavior of a stochastic replicator
process, which describes game dynamics for a symmetric two-player
game under aggregate shocks. We establish an averaging principle
that relates time averages of the process and Nash equilibria of a
suitably modified game. Furthermore, a sufficient condition for tran-
sience is given in terms of mixed equilibria and definiteness of the
payoff matrix. We also present necessary and sufficient conditions for
stochastic stability of pure equilibria.
1. Introduction. The present paper deals with a stochastic variant of
the continuous-time replicator dynamics. We begin with a brief review of
the deterministic model. For a comprehensive discussion, see Hofbauer and
Sigmund (1998), Weibull (1995) and the recent surveys by Hofbauer and Sig-
mund (2003), Nowak and Sigmund (2004) and Sandholm (2007). Consider
a symmetric two-player game with n pure strategies, 1, . . . , n, and n × n
payoff matrix A= (aij). Thus both players have the same set of strategies
and for either player, aij is the payoff from using strategy i if the oppo-
nent uses strategy j. There is no symmetry or skew-symmetry assumption
on A. The replicator dynamics describes how the proportions of strategies
in a population evolve. Consider a large population where every member
is programmed to play one pure strategy. Let ζi(t) denote the size of the
subpopulation of i-players at time t, and let ξi(t) = ζi(t)/[ζ1(t)+ · · ·+ ζn(t)]
denote its proportion. If the population is in state ξ(t) = (ξ1(t), . . . , ξn(t))
T ,
then, under random matching, {Aξ(t)}i is the expected payoff to individuals
playing i. Suppose that this payoff represents the per capita growth rate in
the ith subpopulation. Thus
ζ˙i = ζi{Aξ}i, i= 1, . . . , n.(1.1)
Received February 2007; revised January 2008.
AMS 2000 subject classifications. 60H10, 60J70, 91A22, 92D25.
Key words and phrases. Averaging principle, Dirichlet distribution, exclusion principle,
invariant distribution, Lyapunov function, Nash equilibrium, stochastic asymptotic stabil-
ity, stochastic differential equation.
This is an electronic reprint of the original article published by the
Institute of Mathematical Statistics in The Annals of Applied Probability,
2009, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1347–1368. This reprint differs from the original in
pagination and typographic detail.
1
2 J. HOFBAUER AND L. A. IMHOF
This yields the deterministic replicator dynamics of Taylor and Jonker (1978)
ξ˙i = ξi[{Aξ}i − ξ
TAξ], i= 1, . . . , n.(1.2)
The observation that biological processes modeled by replicator dynamics
are inherently stochastic in nature led Foster and Young (1990) to introduce
a replicator model based on a stochastic differential equation, and it turned
out that even small stochastic effects can qualitatively change the asymp-
totic behavior. The present paper studies a stochastic model of Fudenberg
and Harris (1992) which is similar to that of Foster and Young but has a
more natural boundary behavior. Following Fudenberg and Harris, we intro-
duce random perturbations to the payoffs modeled by independent Gaussian
white noises with intensities σ21 , . . . , σ
2
n. Instead of (1.1) we consider
dZi(t) = Zi(t)[{AX(t)}i dt+ σi dWi(t)], i= 1, . . . , n,(1.3)
where
X = (X1, . . . ,Xn)
T =
1
Z1 + · · ·+Zn
(Z1, . . . ,Zn)
T
and (W1, . . . ,Wn)
T =W is an n-dimensional Brownian motion. The evolu-
tion of the population state X(t) is then given by the stochastic replicator
dynamics
dX(t) = b(X(t))dt+C(X(t))dW (t), X(0) = x0,(1.4)
where
b(x) = [diag(x1, . . . , xn)− xx
T ][A− diag(σ21 , . . . , σ
2
n)]x
and
C(x) = [diag(x1, . . . , xn)− xx
T ] diag(σ1, . . . , σn)
for x ∈∆= {y ∈ [0,1]n :y1+ · · ·+ yn = 1}, and x0 is an initial value in int∆.
Fudenberg and Harris give a complete analysis of the asymptotic behav-
ior for games with two pure strategies. Further papers that study the case
n= 2 include Saito (1997), Amir and Berninghaus (1998), Corradi and Sarin
(2000) and Beggs (2002). Most of the analysis for the case n= 2 relies on
tools specific to one-dimensional diffusions. Few papers treat the general case
n ≥ 2. Cabrales (2000) considers extinction of dominated strategies, Imhof
(2005a) examines the long-run behavior in the presence of evolutionarily
stable strategies and Khasminskii and Potsepun (2006) analyze a related
stochastic replicator model with Stratonovich type random perturbations.
Bena¨ım, Hofbauer and Sandholm (2008) study the relation between recur-
rence and permanence. Imhof (2008) analyzes stochastic dynamics for games
that describe multiple-trial conflicts. Discrete stochastic replicator processes
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have recently been investigated by Schreiber (2001) and Bena¨ım, Schreiber
and Tarre`s (2004).
The aim of the present paper is to provide further insight into the long-
run behavior of the stochastic process {X(t)} and in particular of its time
averages T−1
∫ T
0 X(t)dt in the general case n≥ 2. It turns out that a crucial
role is played by the modified payoff matrix
A˜= (a˜ij)
n
i,j=1, a˜ij = aij −
1
2σ
2
i .(1.5)
In contrast to the deterministic solution ξ(t), the stochastic process {X(t)}
cannot converge to an interior point of ∆. In fact, the only points to which
{X(t)} can converge with positive probability are the vertices of ∆, which
correspond to populations consisting of one single type of players. This is one
reason for our interest in the analysis of the time averages T−1
∫ T
0 X(t)dt,
even in cases where (1.2) has a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium.
In Section 2 we study limit points of the time averages and relate them to
Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria of the modified game A˜.
Section 3 deals with recurrence. As an immediate consequence of the
results in Section 2, we obtain the following averaging principle: if {X(t)}
is positive recurrent, then A˜ has a unique interior Nash equilibrium and the
time averages converge almost surely to this equilibrium. Furthermore, we
consider a certain class of games that includes all zero-sum games, and give
an explicit expression of the invariant densities for the transition probability
functions of the corresponding replicator processes.
In Section 4 we derive an exclusion principle: if there does not exist a
strategy against which every opponent obtains the same payoff under A˜,
then {X(t)} is transient. It is also shown that the process is transient if
there does exist a mixed strategy with this property and A˜ is conditionally
positive definite, that is, yT A˜y > 0 for every y 6= 0 with y1 + · · ·+ yn = 0.
Moreover, we investigate the relation between pure Nash equilibria of A˜ and
stochastic stability of the corresponding vertices of ∆. Thus we obtain three
sufficient conditions for transience of the replicator process. Section 5 relates
our results to some of the central results for the deterministic replicator
dynamics, including the folk theorem of evolutionary game theory.
If we introduce random perturbations into (1.1) using Stratonovich inte-
grals instead of Itoˆ integrals, we obtain
dZ
(s)
i (t) = Z
(s)
i (t){AX
(s)(t)}i dt+ σiZ
(s)
i (t) ◦ dWi(t), i= 1, . . . , n,(1.6)
where X(s) = (Z
(s)
1 + · · · + Z
(s)
n )−1Z(s). See Turelli (1977) for a compari-
son of Itoˆ and Stratonovich equations from a biological point of view. The
Stratonovich equation (1.6) is equivalent to the Itoˆ equation
dZ
(s)
i (t) =Z
(s)
i (t)[{AX
(s)(t)}i +
1
2σ
2
i ]dt+ σiZ
(s)
i (t)dWi(t), i= 1, . . . , n.
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Thus {X(s)(t)} can be regarded as a solution to the Itoˆ stochastic replicator
equation of Fudenberg and Harris for the payoff matrix A(s) with entries
a
(s)
ij = aij +
1
2σ
2
i . Consequently, all the results in the present paper carry
over to the Stratonovich solution {X(s)(t)} when A is replaced by A(s). For
instance, Theorem 3.1(a) yields that if {X(s)(t)} is positive recurrent, then
the time averages T−1
∫ T
0 X
(s)(t)dt converge to an interior Nash equilibrium
of A. Note that modifying A(s) as in (1.5) leads to the matrix A˜(s) = (a
(s)
ij −
1
2σ
2
i ), which is just the original payoff matrix A. Theorem 4.11(a) shows that
every strict Nash equilibrium of A is stochastically asymptotically stable for
{X(s)(t)}. This improves a recent result of Khasminskii and Potsepun (2006);
see Section 5.
2. Time averages. Throughout we assume that {X(t)} = {X(t,ω)} is
a strong solution to (1.4) with initial value x0 ∈ int∆. Then {X(t)} is a
Markov process and it is not difficult to see that, a.s., X(t) stays in int∆ for
all t≥ 0. Note that if some strategies were not present initially, they would
never occur, so that our results would apply to the stochastic dynamics in
the interior of the corresponding face of ∆.
We first prove a result that relates time averages of X(t) and Nash equi-
libria of A˜. The connection with space averages will be considered in Section
3. Recall that p ∈∆ is a Nash equilibrium of A˜ if
pT A˜p≥ qT A˜p for all q ∈∆.
The equilibrium is said to be strict if the inequality is strict for all q 6= p.
Theorem 2.1. (a) For almost every ω for which
1
T
∫ T
0
X(t,ω)dt
converges as T →∞, the limit is a Nash equilibrium of A˜.
(b) The following implication holds for almost all ω. If the limit
y= y(ω) = lim
k→∞
1
Tk(ω)
∫ Tk(ω)
0
X(t,ω)dt
exists for a sequence of times Tk(ω) with
Tk(ω)ր∞ and
logXi(Tk(ω), ω)
Tk(ω)
→ 0, i= 1, . . . , n,(2.1)
then y is a Nash equilibrium of A˜ with {A˜y}1 = · · ·= {A˜y}n.
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Proof. (a) Note first that from (1.3) and Itoˆ’s formula,
d logZi(t) = [{AX(t)}i −
1
2σ
2
i ]dt+ σi dWi(t),(2.2)
so that
d logXi(t)− d logXj(t)
= d logZi(t)− d logZj(t)(2.3)
= [{A˜X(t)}i −{A˜X(t)}j ]dt+ σi dWi(t)− σj dWj(t).
The event Ω0 = {limt→∞Wj(t)/t→ 0 for j = 1, . . . , n} has probability 1. Let
ω0 ∈ Ω0 be such that
1
T
∫ T
0 X(t,ω0)dt converges to y = y(ω0), say. Clearly,
y ∈∆. If yi > 0, then there exist times Tk = Tk(ω0) such that 0< T1 < T2 <
· · · , Tk →∞ and Xi(Tk, ω0)>
1
2yi for all k. Thus [logXi(Tk, ω0)]/Tk → 0. As
ω0 ∈Ω0, it now follows by (2.3) that for every j,
{A˜y}i −{A˜y}j = lim
k→∞
1
Tk
∫ Tk
0
{A˜X(t,ω0)}i −{A˜X(t,ω0)}j dt
= lim
k→∞
logXi(Tk, ω0)− logXj(Tk, ω0)
Tk
≥ 0.
This shows that y is a Nash equilibrium of A˜.
(b) The proof is similar to that of (a). 
For every fixed ω consider the set of limit points (pij) = (pij(ω)) of the
time averages of the products Xi(t,ω)Xj(t,ω) counting the encounters of
plays of strategies i against j, that is, for some sequence of times Tk(ω),
Tk(ω)→∞, pij = lim
k→∞
1
Tk(ω)
∫ Tk(ω)
0
Xi(t,ω)Xj(t,ω)dt ∀i, j.(2.4)
Let pi =
∑n
j=1 pij = limk→∞
1
Tk(ω)
∫ Tk(ω)
0 Xi(t,ω)dt be its marginals.
Theorem 2.2. With probability 1, each limit point (pij) satisfies
(A˜p)l ≤
∑
i,j
a˜ijpij +
1
2
n∑
j=1
σ2j (pj − pjj)(2.5)
for all l, and equality holds for at least one l.
In the deterministic case σi = 0 for all i this result was obtained in Hof-
bauer (2005). The corresponding inequalities state that the correlated distri-
bution (pij) satisfies the exact marginal best response property of Fudenberg
and Levine (1995), or is an element of the Hannan set as defined by Hart
(2005), or a coarse correlated equilibrium in the terminology of Young (2004).
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Proof of Theorem 2.2. From (1.3) we get for S =Z1 + · · ·+Zn
dS = S
[
XTAX dt+
∑
j
σjXj dWj
]
.
Together with d logXl = d logZl − d logS and (2.2) we obtain
d logXl =
[
(A˜X)l −X
T A˜X −
1
2
n∑
j=1
σ2jXj(1−Xj)
]
dt+ σl dWl
(2.6)
−
∑
j
σjXj dWj .
Integrating (2.6) gives
logXl(T )− logXl(0)
T
=
1
T
∫ T
0
(A˜X(t))l dt−
∑
ij
a˜ij
1
T
∫ T
0
Xi(t)Xj(t)dt
(2.7)
−
1
2
n∑
j=1
σ2j
1
T
∫ T
0
Xj(t)(1−Xj(t))dt+ rl(T )
with
rl(T ) = σl
Wl(T )
T
−
∑
j
σj
1
T
∫ T
0
Xj(t)dWj(t).
Since Xj(t) is nonanticipative and |Xj(t)| ≤ 1, it follows from Friedman
[(1975), Corollary 4.6, page 77] that
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
Xj(t)dWj(t) = 0 a.s.
Consequently,
lim
T→∞
rl(T ) = 0 a.s.(2.8)
Since logXl(T )≤ 0, every limit point of the left-hand side of (2.7) is nonpos-
itive and hence the inequalities (2.5) follow. Now looking at one limit point
(pij) arising for the sequence Tk →∞, let (after possibly refining the time
sequence) x˜= limTk→∞X(Tk) and choose l s.t. x˜l > 0. Then the left-hand
side in (2.7) goes to 0 and there is equality in (2.5). 
Remark 2.3. For almost every ω for which the sequence of times Tk(ω)
satisfies (2.1), the corresponding limit matrix (pij) = (pij(ω)) satisfies equal-
ity in (2.5) for all l.
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3. Recurrence. If the ω-limit of the orbit of ξ(t) given by the determin-
istic equation (1.2) is contained in int∆ and A has a unique interior equilib-
rium, then the time averages 1T
∫ T
0 ξ(t)dt converge to that equilibrium; see
Schuster et al. (1981) or Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998), Theorem 7.6.4. The
following theorem contains a stochastic counterpart and also establishes a
connection with space averages.
We write Px0 to indicate the probability computed under the condition
X(0) = x0 and Ex0 to denote expectation with respect to Px0 . For x ∈∆ and
ε > 0 let Bε(x) = {y ∈∆:‖y − x‖ < ε}, where ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean
norm. The process {X(t)} is called recurrent if for every x ∈ int∆ and every
ε > 0,
Px0{X(Tk) ∈Bε(x) for a sequence of finite random times Tk
increasing to infinity}= 1.
See Bhattacharya (1978) for various characterizations of recurrence of diffu-
sions. If {X(t)} is recurrent, its transition probability function has a unique
(up to positive multiples) σ-finite invariant measure ν on int∆ [Khas’minskii
(1960)]. If ν(int∆)<∞, {X(t)} is said to be positive recurrent. In this case,
we will normalize ν and consider the invariant distribution pi = [ν(int∆)]−1ν.
If {X(t)} is recurrent and ν(int∆) =∞, {X(t)} is said to be null recurrent.
Theorem 3.1 (Averaging principle). (a) If {X(t)} is positive recurrent
with invariant distribution pi on int∆, then yˆ :=
∫
ydpi(y) is the unique
interior Nash equilibrium of A˜ and
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
X(t)dt= yˆ a.s.
(b) Let N = {y ∈∆:{A˜y}1 = · · ·= {A˜y}n}. If {X(t)} is null recurrent,
then N 6=∅. Moreover, if (Tk)
∞
k=1 is a sequence of random times such that
Tk ր∞ a.s. and
logXi(Tk)
Tk
→ 0 a.s., i= 1, . . . , n,(3.1)
then, a.s., every accumulation point of the sequence
1
Tk
∫ Tk
0
X(t)dt, k = 1,2, . . . ,
belongs to the set N .
Proof. (a) If {X(t)} is positive recurrent with invariant distribution
pi on int∆, then yˆ :=
∫
ydpi(y) ∈ int∆. Moreover, by the ergodic theorem
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[Bhattacharya and Waymire (1990), page 623], limT→∞
1
T
∫ T
0 X(t)dt= yˆ a.s.
It follows from Theorem 2.1(a) that yˆ is an equilibrium of A˜.
It remains to show that yˆ is the only interior equilibrium of A˜. If not,
then there is a line of equilibria which implies the existence of a nonzero
vector c ∈ Rn such that
∑
ci = 0 and c
T A˜x = 0 holds for all x ∈∆. This
together with (2.6) implies
n∑
i=1
cid logXi(t) =
n∑
i=1
ciσi dWi(t).(3.2)
Integrating gives
n∑
i=1
ci log
Xi(t)
Xi(0)
=
n∑
i=1
ciσiWi(t).
The right-hand side is a one-dimensional Brownian motion and hence null
recurrent. This contradicts the assumption that the process {X(t)} is posi-
tive recurrent in int∆.
(b) The assertion is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.1(b). Note
that null recurrence implies that there exists a sequence (Tk) satisfying (3.1).

Remark 3.2. (a) Generically, the set N defined in Theorem 3.1(b) con-
tains at most one element. Thus, if N = {y}, then
lim
k→∞
1
Tk
∫ Tk
0
X(t)dt= y a.s.
for every sequence of random times (Tk) with (3.1).
(b) Every interior Nash equilibrium of A˜ belongs to N . Thus if {X(t)} is
positive recurrent, then yˆ ∈ N , and as yˆ is the only interior Nash equilib-
rium, N = {yˆ}.
Theorem 3.3. If {X(t)} is positive recurrent with invariant distribu-
tion pi on int∆, then the time averages in (2.4) converge a.s. to pij :=∫
yiyj dpi(y). Therefore, a.s., there is a unique limit matrix, (pij), all its
elements are positive, and there holds equality in (2.5) for all l.
Proof. This follows again from the ergodic theorem. For the last state-
ment, choose a time sequence Tk →∞ with (3.1) and apply Remark 2.3.

For n = 2 we can compute this limit matrix explicitly: Let A =
(
0 1
1 0
)
and σ1 = σ2 = σ > 0. Then by Proposition 1 of Fudenberg and Harris (1992)
or Corollary 3.10, {X(t)} is positive recurrent, so that, by Theorem 3.1(a),
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p1 = p2 =
1
2 . Hence (A˜p)1 =
1
2 −
σ2
2 . Since there holds equality in (2.5) and
since
∑
j pij = pi and p12 = p21, we obtain
(A˜p)1 = (p12 + p21)−
σ2
2
(p11 + p22) = 2p12 −
σ2
2
(1− 2p12).
It follows that p12 = p21 =
1
4+2σ2 <
1
4 and p11 = p22 =
1
2 −p12 >
1
4 . For large σ
the matrix (pij) approaches
(
1/2 0
0 1/2
)
, which means that the process spends
most of the time near the pure strategy states.
Remark 3.4. If the process {X(t)} is null recurrent, then for almost all
ω there is at least one accumulation point (pij) = (pij(ω)) for which equality
holds for all l in (2.5).
Corollary 3.5. Suppose A˜=−A˜T is a zero-sum game. Then the pro-
cess {X(t)} is not positive recurrent.
Proof. If it were positive recurrent, then, by Theorem 3.1, A˜p= 0 for
some p ∈ int∆, and Theorem 3.3 implies equality for all l in (2.5). Therefore∑n
j=1 σ
2
j (pj − pjj) = 0. Since σj > 0 we get pj = pjj which contradicts pij > 0
for all i, j in Theorem 3.3. 
We next investigate invariant densities and recurrence properties of {X(t)}
for payoff matrices that satisfy for some γ ∈R the condition
aij + aji− aii − ajj =
γ
2
(σ2i + σ
2
j ) for all i 6= j.(3.3)
If n = 2, (3.3) is always satisfied for a certain γ. For general n, the payoff
matrices satisfying (3.3) can be characterized as those obtained by subtract-
ing diagonal elements γσ2j /2 from the payoff matrix of a zero-sum game, and
rescaling [i.e., adding multiples of 1= (1, . . . ,1)T to each column] or adding
multiples of 1T to each row. Note that condition (3.3) is equivalent to the
condition obtained by replacing every akl in (3.3) by a˜kl.
Theorem 3.6. Let α ∈ Rn and set γ = α1 + · · · + αn. The transition
probability function of {X(t)} has an invariant density (with respect to
Lebesgue measure on int∆) given by
n∏
i=1
xαi−1i , (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ int∆,
if and only if one of the following two conditions (a) and (b) holds.
(a) A satisfies (3.3) with γ 6= −1 and {A˜α}1 = · · ·= {A˜α}n and if γ = 0,
then {A˜α}1 =
∑n
i=1 a˜iiαi −
1
2
∑n
i=1 σ
2
i α
2
i .
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(b) γ =−1 and for k = 1, . . . , n,
σ2k
2
+
1
2
n∑
i=1
σ2i α
2
i +αkσ
2
k − a˜kk −
n∑
i=1
αia˜ik = 0.
Proof. For simplicity, we work with the Rn−1-valued process Y (t) =
Ψ(X(t)), where Ψ(x1, . . . , xn) = (log(x1/xn), . . . , log(xn−1/xn))
T . Let ek de-
note the kth column of the n× n identity matrix. We have from (2.3)
dYj(t) = {(ej − en)
T A˜Ψ−1(Y (t))}dt+ σj dWj(t)− σn dWn(t),
j = 1, . . . , n− 1. Let L˜ denote the formal adjoint of the differential operator
corresponding to {Y (t)}, that is,
L˜f(y) =
1
2
n−1∑
i,j=1
∂2
∂yi ∂yj
[(σ2n + δijσ
2
i )f(y)]−
n−1∑
i=1
∂
∂yi
[(ei − en)
T A˜Ψ−1(y)f(y)]
for f ∈C2(Rn−1). A change of variables shows that
∏n
i=1 x
αi−1
i is an invariant
density for the transition probability function of {X(t)} if and only if
g(y) =
exp(
∑n−1
i=1 αiyi)
(1 + ey1 + · · ·+ eyn−1)
∑n
i=1
αi
, y ∈Rn−1,
is an invariant density for the transition probability function of {Y (t)}.
Set
φ(y) = 1+ ey1 + · · ·+ eyn−1 .
Then for all i, j = 1, . . . , n, i 6= j,
∂g(y)
∂yi
=
g(y)
φ(y)
[αiφ(y)− γe
yi ],
∂2g(y)
∂y2i
=
g(y)
φ2(y)
{[αiφ(y)− γe
yi ]2 + γeyi [eyi − φ(y)]},
∂2g(y)
∂yi ∂yj
=
g(y)
φ2(y)
{[αiφ(y)− γe
yi ][αjφ(y)− γe
yj ] + γeyi+yj}.
Hence
L˜g(y) =
g(y)
φ2(y)
{ ∑
1≤k<l≤n−1
ρkle
yk+yl +
n−1∑
k=1
ρkne
yk + ρn +
n−1∑
k=1
ρke
2yk
}
,(3.4)
where
ρk =
1
2
{
n∑
i=1
σ2i α
2
i + γσ
2
k(γ − 2αk)
}
+
n∑
i=1
αi(a˜kk − a˜ik),
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ρkl =
n∑
i=1
σ2i α
2
i − γ
[
σ2k
(
αk +
1
2
)
+ σ2l
(
αl +
1
2
)]
− a˜kk − a˜ll + (γ +1)(a˜kl + a˜lk)−
n∑
i=1
αi(a˜ik + a˜il).
For k 6= l,
ρkl − ρk − ρl = (γ + 1)
[
akl + alk − akk − all −
γ
2
(σ2k + σ
2
l )
]
.(3.5)
Furthermore,
ρ1 = · · ·= ρn = 0 ⇐⇒ Bα=
(
1
2
n∑
i=1
σ2i α
2
i
)
1,(3.6)
where
B = A˜T − a˜1T −
γ
2
s1T + γ diag(σ21 , . . . , σ
2
n),
a˜= (a˜11, . . . , a˜nn)
T , s= (σ21 , . . . , σ
2
n)
T .
Condition (3.3) is equivalent to
B =−A˜+ 1a˜T +
γ
2
1sT .(3.7)
Now suppose
∏n
i=1 x
αi−1
i is an invariant density for the transition proba-
bility function of {X(t)}. Then L˜g = 0; see Theorem 8.4 in Pinsky (1995),
page 181. Hence, in view of (3.4), ρk = 0 for all k and ρkl = 0 for all k 6= l.
Suppose first that γ 6= −1. It then follows by (3.5) that A satisfies (3.3).
Moreover, by (3.6) and (3.7),(
1
2
n∑
i=1
σ2i α
2
i
)
1=Bα=
(
a˜Tα+
γ
2
sTα
)
1− A˜α.
This shows that A˜α is proportional to 1, and if γ = 0, then {A˜α}1 =∑n
i=1 a˜iiαi −
1
2
∑n
i=1 σ
2
i α
2
i . Thus condition (a) is satisfied. If γ = −1, then
condition (b) holds because ρk = 0 for all k.
Conversely, suppose condition (a) holds. Then, by (3.7),
Bα=
(
a˜Tα+
γ
2
sTα
)
1− A˜α= µ1(3.8)
for some µ ∈ R. Thus αTBα = γµ. By (3.7), BT +B = γ diag(σ21 , . . . , σ
2
n),
and so 2γµ = αT (BT + B)α = γ
∑n
i=1α
2
i σ
2
i . If γ 6= 0, it follows that µ =
1
2
∑n
i=1α
2
i σ
2
i . If γ = 0, then, according to condition (a), A˜α= [(
∑n
i=1αi(a˜ii−
1
2σ
2
i αi)]1, and it is obvious from (3.8) that again µ=
1
2
∑n
i=1α
2
i σ
2
i . It there-
fore follows from (3.8) and (3.6) that ρk = 0 for all k. Equations (3.3) and
12 J. HOFBAUER AND L. A. IMHOF
(3.5) now imply that ρkl = 0 for all k 6= l. Consequently, by (3.4), L˜g = 0. If
condition (b) holds, then ρk = 0 for all k, and by (3.5), ρkl = 0 for all k 6= l.
Thus, again, L˜g = 0. It now follows by Theorem 8.5 in Pinsky [(1995), page
182] that g is an invariant density, provided the diffusion corresponding to
the solution to the generalized martingale problem for L˜g on Rn−1 does not
explode, where L˜gf = 1g L˜(gf). We have
L˜gf(y) = L˜0f(y) +
n−1∑
j=1
{
n−1∑
i=1
(σ2n + δijσ
2
i )
g(y)
∂g(y)
yi
}
∂f(y)
∂yj
,
where
L˜0f(y) =
1
2
n−1∑
i,j=1
∂2
∂yi ∂yj
[(σ2n + δijσ
2
i )f(y)]−
n−1∑
i=1
(ei − en)
T A˜Ψ−1(y)
∂f(y)
∂yi
and
1
g(y)
∂g(y)
yi
= αi −
γeyi
φ(y)
.
Thus the coefficients of L˜g are Lipschitz continuous and bounded so that
the martingale problem for L˜g has a unique solution and explosions do not
occur. 
Remark 3.7. SupposeA satisfies (3.3). Then A is conditionally negative
[positive] definite if γ > [<]0. Indeed, if y1 + · · ·+ yn = 0, then, by (3.3),
2yTAy=
∑
i,j : i 6=j
yi(aij + aji − aii − ajj)yj =−γ
∑
i
σ2i y
2
i .
In particular, if (3.3) holds with γ 6= 0, then there can be at most one α
with α1 + · · ·+ αn = γ that satisfies the equations {A˜α}1 = · · ·= {A˜α}n in
condition (a) of Theorem 3.6.
The density
∏n
i=1 x
αi−1
i in Theorem 3.6 is integrable if and only if αi > 0
for all i. A random variable U with P{U ∈ int∆}= 1 which has a density
that is proportional to
∏n
i=1 x
αi−1
i is said to have a Dirichlet distribution
with parameter α= (α1, . . . , αn)
T , provided αi > 0 for all i. If U has such a
distribution and γ = α1 + · · ·+αn, then
EU = γ−1α, Var[Ui] =
αi(γ − αi)
γ2(γ + 1)
.(3.9)
Corollary 3.8. The process {X(t)} is positive recurrent and its tran-
sition probability function has an invariant Dirichlet distribution with pa-
rameter α if and only if A satisfies (3.3) with some γ > 0 and γ−1α is an
interior Nash equilibrium of A˜.
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Remark 3.9. If n = 2, then the condition that A satisfies (3.3) with
some γ > 0 and A˜ has an interior Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the in-
equalities a˜12 > a˜22 and a˜21 > a˜11. For this case, the stable coexistence case,
Fudenberg and Harris (1992) already calculated the ergodic distribution of
{X(t)} by means of the normalized speed measure.
Corollary 3.10. Suppose A satisfies (3.3) for some γ ∈R. Then {X(t)}
is positive recurrent if and only if A˜ has an interior Nash equilibrium and
γ > 0.
Proof. To prove the sufficiency of the condition suppose that x is an
interior Nash equilibrium of A˜ and γ > 0. Set α= γx. Then γ−1α is an inte-
rior Nash equilibrium and so, by Corollary 3.8, {X(t)} is positive recurrent.
To prove necessity, suppose {X(t)} is positive recurrent. Then, by Theo-
rem 3.1(a), A˜ has an interior Nash equilibrium x, say. Let α= γx. If γ 6=−1,
then Theorem 3.6 shows that
∏n
i=1 x
αi−1
i is an invariant density, which must
be integrable, so that γ > 0. It remains to rule out that γ =−1. If γ =−1,
A would be conditionally positive definite by Remark 3.7, so that Theorem
4.5 would yield that {X(t)} is transient. 
Remark 3.11. Corollaries 3.8 and 3.10 show that for games with (3.3)
only Dirichlet distributions can be invariant distributions, and if {X(t)} is
positive recurrent and σ1 = · · ·= σn, then {X(t)} remains positive recurrent
if σ1, . . . , σn are replaced with κσ1, . . . , κσn for any κ > 0. As κց 0, γր∞
and, in view of (3.9), the invariant distribution converges weakly to the unit
mass concentrated at the Nash equilibrium of A. As κր∞, the invariant
distribution converges vaguely to the zero measure on int∆.
Corollary 3.12. The density
∏n
i=1 x
−1
i , x ∈ int∆, is invariant for the
transition probability function of {X(t)} if and only if
aij + aji − aii − ajj = 0 for all i, j.(3.10)
Moreover, if (3.10) holds and there exists β ∈Rn such that
β1 + · · ·+ βn = 0, {A˜β}1 = · · ·= {A˜β}n and β
T A˜ 6= 0,(3.11)
then
∏n
i=1 x
αi−1
i is another invariant density, where αi = cβi and c= 2{β
T A˜}1/
(
∑n
i=1 σ
2
i β
2
i ) 6= 0. In this case, {X(t)} is transient.
Proof. The claimed equivalence is an immediate consequence of The-
orem 3.6. If (3.10) and (3.11) hold, then
n∑
i=1
a˜iiαi −
1
2
n∑
i=1
σ2i α
2
i = c
n∑
i=1
(a˜ii − a˜i1)βi = c
n∑
i=1
(a1i − a11)βi = {A˜α}1,
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so that
∏n
i=1 x
αi−1
i is an invariant density by Theorem 3.6. Furthermore,
(3.10) and (3.11) imply that {βT A˜}1 = · · ·= {β
T A˜}n, and so, as β
T A˜ 6= 0,
we have c 6= 0. Thus the invariant densities
∏n
i=1 x
−1
i and
∏n
i=1 x
αi−1
i are not
proportional. This implies that {X(t)} is transient; see Khas’minskii (1960)
or Pinsky (1995), pages 148 and 181. 
Remark 3.13. If A˜ is a zero-sum game, then (3.11) is equivalent to
{A˜β}1 = · · ·= {A˜β}n 6= 0.
4. Transience and stability of Nash equilibria. The deterministic repli-
cator dynamics satisfies an important exclusion principle: if the replicator
equation (1.2) has no interior rest point, that is, if there does not exist
p ∈ int∆ such that {Ap}1 = · · ·= {Ap}n, then every orbit converges to the
boundary of ∆; see Hofbauer (1981) or Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998), The-
orem 7.6.1. The following result for the stochastic replicator dynamics yields
convergence to the boundary under a slightly stronger condition on A˜.
The process {X(t)} is said to be transient if Px0{X(t)→ bd∆}= 1.
Theorem 4.1 (Exclusion principle). If there does not exist p ∈∆ such
that {A˜p}1 = · · ·= {A˜p}n, then {X(t)} is transient.
Theorem 4.1 is an immediate consequence of the averaging principle (The-
orem 3.1) and the dichotomy between recurrence and transience; see, for ex-
ample, Theorem 8.1 in Pinsky (1995), page 74. In the following we present
an alternative proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. If there is no p ∈∆ such that {A˜p}1 = · · ·=
{A˜p}n, then by a simple separation argument [see, e.g., Hofbauer (1981)]
there exists a c ∈Rn such that c1+ · · ·+ cn = 0 and c
T A˜x> 0 for all x ∈∆.
By compactness there is δ > 0 such that cT A˜x≥ δ > 0 for all x ∈∆. Since
c1 + · · ·+ cn = 0, (2.6) implies
n∑
i=1
cid logXi(t) = c
T A˜X(t)dt+
n∑
i=1
ciσi dWi(t).(4.1)
Integrating gives
n∑
i=1
ci log
Xi(t)
Xi(0)
≥ δt+
n∑
i=1
ciσiWi(t),
and hence
∑n
i=1 ci logXi(t)→∞ a.s., as t→∞, which shows transience. 
Corollary 4.2. If strategy k is strictly dominated in the game A˜ [i.e.,
there is a strategy q ∈ ∆ such that (A˜x)k < q
T A˜x for all x ∈ ∆], then
Xk(t)→ 0 a.s.
STOCHASTIC REPLICATOR DYNAMICS 15
Proof. Choose c= q− ek in the previous proof which shows
n∑
i=1
qi logXi(t)− logXk(t)→∞ a.s.
Since the sum is bounded above, logXk(t)→−∞ a.s., or Xk(t)→ 0 a.s.

The following example shows that the weaker condition that A˜ has no
interior Nash equilibrium (or that strategy k is weakly dominated) is not
sufficient for transience.
Example 4.3. Suppose n = 2 and a˜11 = a˜21, a˜12 > a˜22. Then A˜ does
not have an interior Nash equilibrium. Using Feller’s criterion [see, e.g.,
Proposition 5.22 in Karatzas and Shreve (1991), page 345] one may show
that {X(t)} is recurrent. In view of Theorem 3.1(a), {X(t)} must be null
recurrent.
Remark 4.4. If A satisfies (3.10) and there exists β satisfying (3.11),
then β1 + · · ·+ βn = 0 and {β
T A˜}1 = · · ·= {β
T A˜}n 6= 0. That {X(t)} must
then be transient can also be shown as in the alternative proof of Theorem
4.1.
For the second sufficient transience criterion recall that an n× n matrix
B is said to be conditionally positive definite if yTBy> 0 for all y 6= 0 with
y1+ · · ·+ yn = 0. Note that A˜ is conditionally positive definite if and only if
A is conditionally positive definite.
Theorem 4.5. Suppose there exists p ∈Rn\{e1, . . . ,en} such that {A˜p}1 =
· · ·= {A˜p}n and p1+ · · ·+pn = 1. Suppose further that A˜ (or A) is condition-
ally positive definite. Then min{Xi(t) : i ∈ I
+}→ 0 a.s., where I+ = {i :pi >
0}. In particular, {X(t)} is transient.
Proof. Set
φ(x) =
n∑
j=1
pj logxj , x ∈ int∆.
By (2.6),
φ(X(t)) = φ(X(0)) +
∫ t
0
h(X(s))ds+R(t),
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where
h(x) = pT A˜x− xT A˜x−
1
2
n∑
j=1
σ2jxj(1− xj)
=−(p− x)T A˜(p− x)−
1
2
n∑
j=1
σ2jxj(1− xj)
and
R(t) =
n∑
j=1
pjσjWj(t)−
n∑
j=1
σj
∫ t
0
Xj(s)dWj(s).
Since A˜ is conditionally positive definite, (p−x)T A˜(p−x)≥ 0 for all x ∈∆,
with equality if and only if x= p. Moreover,
∑n
j=1 σ
2
jxj(1− xj)≥ 0 for all
x ∈∆, with equality if and only if x ∈ {e1, . . . ,en}. As p ∈R
n \{e1, . . . ,en},
it follows that there exists some ε > 0 such that
h(x)≤−ε for all x ∈ int∆.
In view of (2.8), R(t)/t→ 0 a.s. Consequently, a.s.,
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
∑
i∈I+
pi logXi(t)≤ lim sup
t→∞
1
t
φ(X(t))≤−ε+ limsup
t→∞
1
t
R(t) =−ε.
Thus min{Xi(t) : i ∈ I
+}→ 0 a.s. 
Remark 4.6. If A is conditionally positive definite and there exists
p ∈Rn \∆ such that {A˜p}1 = · · ·= {A˜p}n and p1+ · · ·+ pn = 1, then there
cannot exist q ∈ ∆ with {A˜q}1 = · · · = {A˜q}n, and it follows already by
Theorem 4.1 that X(t) converges to bd∆ a.s. Theorem 4.5 provides in this
case a proper subset of bd∆ to which X(t) converges a.s.
Remark 4.7. Theorem 4.5 complements the following stability result of
Imhof (2005a): If A has an interior Nash equilibrium and A is conditionally
negative definite, then {X(t)} is positive recurrent and spends most of the
time in a small neighborhood of the equilibrium, provided σ1, . . . , σn are
sufficiently small. Note that the transience result holds without restriction
on the size of noise.
Corollary 4.8. If A is conditionally positive definite and none of the
columns of A˜ is proportional to 1, then {X(t)} is transient.
Proof. If there does not exist p ∈∆ with {A˜p}1 = · · ·= {A˜p}n, then
Theorem 4.1 yields transience. Otherwise, there does exist such a p ∈ ∆,
but if none of the columns of A˜ is proportional to 1, then p cannot belong
to {e1, . . . ,en}. Transience now follows from Theorem 4.5. 
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Remark 4.9. If one of the columns of A˜ is proportional to 1, then
{X(t)} cannot be positive recurrent. This follows from Theorem 3.1(a).
Example 4.10. In the case n= 2 the assumptions of Theorem 4.5 are
satisfied if a˜11 > a˜21 and a˜12 < a˜22. This means that the game A˜ is bistable:
both pure strategies are strict equilibria.
A point p ∈∆ is said to be stochastically asymptotically stable [Arnold
(1974), page 181] if for every open neighborhood U of p and every ε > 0 there
is a neighborhood V of p such that for every initial state x ∈ V ∩ int∆,
Px
{
X(t) ∈ U for all t≥ 0, lim
t→∞
X(t) = p
}
≥ 1− ε.
For every p ∈∆ \ {e1, . . . ,en} and every x ∈ int∆, Px{X(t)→ p} = 0; see
Imhof (2005a). Thus only the vertices of ∆ can be stochastically asymptot-
ically stable.
Theorem 4.11. (a) Suppose strategy k is a strict Nash equilibrium in
the game A˜, that is,
akk > ajk +
σ2k
2
−
σ2j
2
for all j 6= k.
Then ek is stochastically asymptotically stable.
(b) Suppose that for some x ∈ int∆,
Px
{
lim
t→∞
X(t) = ek
}
> 0.
Then strategy k must be a Nash equilibrium of A˜. Moreover, if there exists
i 6= k with a˜ik = a˜kk, then there exists j 6= k such that a˜ij < a˜kj .
Proof. (a) Let L denote the second-order differential operator associ-
ated with {X(t)}, that is,
Lf(x) =
n∑
j=1
bj(x)
∂f(x)
∂xj
+
1
2
n∑
j,k=1
γjk(x)
∂2f(x)
∂xj ∂xk
, f ∈C2(int∆),
where
bj(x) = xj(ej − x)
T [A− diag(σ21 , . . . , σ
2
n)]x,
γjk(x) =
n∑
ν=1
cjν(x)ckν(x), cjk(x) =
{
xj(1− xj)σj, j = k,
−xjxkσk, j 6= k.
Consider the Lyapunov function
φ(x) =
∑
j 6=k
xrj ,
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where r > 0 will be chosen later. Clearly, φ(x)≥ 0 for all x ∈∆, and φ(x) = 0
if and only if x= ek. We will show that there exists a neighborhood V of ek
such that for some c > 0,
Lφ(x)≤−cφ(x) for all x ∈ V ∩ int∆.
This yields the assertion by Theorem 4 and Remark 2 in Gichman and
Skorochod (1971), pages 314–315, or Theorem 4.1 in Has’minski˘ı (1980),
page 167.
For all x ∈ int∆,
Lφ(x) = r
∑
j 6=k
xrj(ej − x)
T [A− diag(σ21 , . . . , σ
2
n)]x+
r(r− 1)
2
∑
j 6=k
γjj(x)x
r−2
j
= r
∑
j 6=k
xrj
{
(ej − x)
T A˜x+
r
2
(
σ2j (1− 2xj) +
n∑
ν=1
σ2νx
2
ν
)
+
1
2
n∑
ν=1
σ2νxν(xν − 1)
}
≤ r
∑
j 6=k
xrj{(ej − x)
T A˜x+ rmax{σ21 , . . . , σ
2
n}}.
Since k is a strict Nash equilibrium for A˜, there exists ε > 0 such that for all
j 6= k, (ek − ej)
T A˜ek > ε. Thus there is a neighborhood V of ek such that
(x− ej)
T A˜x>
ε
2
for all x ∈ V and j 6= k.
Now if r > 0 is so small that rmax{σ21 , . . . , σ
2
n}<
1
4ε, then for all x ∈ V ∩ int∆
Lφ(x)≤ r
∑
j 6=k
xrj
(
−
ε
2
+
ε
4
)
=−
rε
4
φ(x).
(b) If limt→∞X(t,ω) = ek, then the time averages
1
T
∫ T
0 X(t,ω)dt con-
verge to ek, too. It follows from Theorem 2.1 that strategy k is a Nash
equilibrium. For an indirect proof of the remaining part assume there ex-
ists i 6= k such that a˜ik = a˜kk and a˜ij ≥ a˜kj for all j. Since two-dimensional
Brownian motion is recurrent, there is a sequence of random times (Tl)
∞
l=1
such that Tl ր∞ and, for every l, Wi(Tl) ≥ 0 and Wk(Tl) ≤ 0. It follows
that for every l,
log
Xi(Tl)
Xk(Tl)
− log
Xi(0)
Xk(0)
=
∫ Tl
0
{A˜X(t)}i − {A˜X(t)}k dt+ σiWi(Tl)− σkWk(Tl)≥ 0,
which contradicts the assumption that Px{limt→∞X(t) = ek}> 0. 
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Remark 4.12. Theorem 4.11(a) improves Theorem 4.1 of Imhof (2005a),
where the same stability assertion was proved under the stronger condition
that
akk > ajk + σ
2
k for all j 6= k.
Note that in view of Example 4.3 or Theorem 4.11(b), the stability condition
in Theorem 4.11(a) cannot be weakened to
akk ≥ ajk +
σ2k
2
−
σ2j
2
for all j 6= k.
Remark 4.13. If n= 2, Theorem 4.11 can be strengthened. For n= 2,
the following three assertions are equivalent.
(a) Strategy k is a strict Nash equilibrium of A˜.
(b) The point ek is stochastically asymptotically stable.
(c) For some x ∈ int∆, Px{limt→∞X(t) = ek}> 0.
This is in contrast to the deterministic case where a pure strategy can be
asymptotically stable without being a strict equilibrium.
For the proof, it remains to show that (c) implies (a). Suppose Px{X(t)→
e1}> 0. By Theorem 4.11(b), a˜11 ≥ a˜21, and if a˜11 = a˜21, then a˜22 < a˜12. But
if a˜11 = a˜21 and a˜22 < a˜12, then {X(t)} is null recurrent; see Example 4.3.
This contradicts the assumption that Px{X(t)→ e1}> 0, and it follows that
a˜11 > a˜21.
Corollary 4.14. If n ∈ {2,3} and A is conditionally positive definite,
then {X(t)} is transient.
Proof for n= 3. If none of the columns of A˜ is proportional to 1, then
transience follows from Corollary 4.8. Suppose now that, for example, a˜11 =
a˜21 = a˜31. Since A˜ is conditionally positive definite, 0< a˜ii− a˜ji− a˜ij+ a˜jj for
i 6= j. Hence a˜12 < a˜22 and a˜13 < a˜33. Moreover, 0< a˜22− a˜32− a˜23+ a˜33, so
that a˜22 > a˜32 or a˜33 > a˜23. It follows that strategy 2 or strategy 3 is a strict
Nash equilibrium of A˜. Thus, by Theorem 4.11, e2 or e3 is stochastically
asymptotically stable and {X(t)} is transient. 
Example 4.15. Consider the rock–scissors–paper game with payoff ma-
trix
A=
 0 −a1 a2a2 0 −a1
−a1 a2 0
 , a1, a2 > 0.
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Thus strategy 3 beats strategy 2, 2 beats 1 and 1 beats 3. If a1 > a2, then
for all y ∈R3 \ {0} with y1+ y2 + y3 = 0,
yTAy=
a1 − a2
2
{y21 + y
2
2 + y
2
3}> 0.
Hence, according to Corollary 4.14, {X(t)} is transient. On the other hand,
if a1 < a2, {X(t)} is positive recurrent, provided σ1, σ2, σ3 are sufficiently
small; see Imhof (2005b). Moreover, if a1 < a2 and σ1 = σ2 = σ3 > 0, Corol-
lary 3.8 yields that the invariant distribution is the Dirichlet distribution
with parameter (a2 − a1)/(3σ
2
1)1. Finally, if a1 = a2 and σ1 = σ2 = σ3 > 0,
then Corollary 3.5 and 3.10 each imply that {X(t)} is not positive recurrent.
To see that this follows from Corollary 3.5, note that the stochastic repli-
cator dynamics remains unchanged if a constant is added to every entry in
a column of A. In view of Corollary 3.12 we conjecture that {X(t)} is null
recurrent in this case.
Corollary 4.16. Suppose A satisfies (3.3) with some γ ∈R. Then each
of the following conditions is sufficient for transience of {X(t)}.
(i) γ < 0 and n ∈ {2,3}.
(ii) There exists p ∈∆ \ {e1, . . . ,en} with {A˜p}1 = · · ·= {A˜p}1 and γ <
0.
(iii) There does not exist p ∈∆ with {A˜p}1 = · · ·= {A˜p}1.
Proof. This follows from Remark 3.7, Corollary 4.14 and Theorems 4.1
and 4.5. 
5. Related results. The aim of this section is to put our results into
perspective by discussing the connection with corresponding results for the
deterministic replicator dynamics. We concentrate on the following funda-
mental properties of the deterministic model (1.2).
(A) Every Nash equilibrium of A is a rest point.
(B) Every strict Nash equilibrium of A is asymptotically stable.
(C) Every stable rest point is a Nash equilibrium of A.
(D) If an interior orbit converges, its limit is a Nash equilibrium of A.
(E) Every evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of A is asymptotically stable.
(F) If (1.2) is permanent, that is, if there exists a compact set K ⊂ int∆
such that for every initial state ξ(0) = x ∈ int∆, ξ(t) ∈ K for t large
enough, then there exists a unique interior rest point and for any initial
state in int∆, the time averages T−1
∫ T
0 ξ(t)dt converge to that rest
point.
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Parts (A)–(D) constitute the folk theorem of evolutionary game theory. For
proofs of all of these statements, see Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998). The
stochastic replicator dynamics (1.4) has no absorbing points except for the
vertices e1, . . . ,en, so that part (A) is in marked contrast to the stochastic
situation. Note that the converse of (A) holds neither for the deterministic
nor for the stochastic replicator dynamics.
Theorem 4.11(a) shows that part (B) essentially carries over to the stochas-
tic case if the payoff matrix A is replaced by A˜. In contrast to what might
be expected from the deterministic case, the assumption that a given strat-
egy is a strict Nash equilibrium does not imply almost sure convergence
to the equilibrium for suitable initial values. Indeed, if A˜ describes a co-
ordination game with two strategies, then for every initial state x ∈ int∆,
Px{X(t)→ e1}< 1. Theorem 4.11(b) can be regarded as a weak analog of
part (C). A sufficient condition for Px{X(t)→ ek} = 1 for all x ∈ int∆ is
given in Imhof (2008).
For the process {X(s)(t)} determined by the Stratonovich stochastic dif-
ferential equation (1.6), we obtain from Theorem 4.11(a) (applied to the
corresponding Itoˆ equation) that ek is stochastically asymptotically stable
if akk >maxj 6=k ajk. That the inequality
akk >max
j 6=k
ajk +
1
8
(∑
j 6=k
σ2j −
(n− 3)2∑
j 6=k σ
−2
j
)
is sufficient for stochastic asymptotic stability of ek has been shown by
Khasminskii and Potsepun (2006). In view of Example 4.3, the sufficient
condition akk >maxj 6=k ajk cannot be weakened to akk ≥maxj 6=k ajk.
Theorem 4.11(b) also yields the following analog of part (D). If for some
x ∈ int∆ and some p ∈ ∆, Px{X(t)→ p} > 0, then, by Theorem 4.3 of
Imhof (2005a), p ∈ {e1, . . . ,en}, so that, by Theorem 4.11(b), p is a Nash
equilibrium of A˜. However, the natural stochastic analog of (D) is provided
by Theorem 2.1(a).
Concerning part (E) note that in Example 4.3, strategy e1 is an ESS of
A˜, which is not stochastically asymptotically stable. However, the existence
of an interior ESS of A implies positive recurrence and that the invariant
distribution puts most mass near the ESS, provided that σ1, . . . , σn are small
enough; see Imhof (2005a). Since the trajectories do not converge to the
ESS nor to any other point, it is natural to study convergence of their
time averages. By Theorem 3.1(a), the averages converge a.s. to the unique
interior Nash equilibrium of A˜.
Theorem 3.1(a) can also be seen as showing that an analog of the con-
clusion of part (F) holds when {X(t)} is positive recurrent. The connection
between permanence and recurrence is examined in Bena¨ım, Hofbauer and
Sandholm (2008).
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